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Abstract. Current methods of disseminating scholarly information focus on the use of
journals who retain exclusive rights in the material they publish. Using a simple model
we explore the reasons for the development of the traditional journal model, why it is
no longer efficient and how it could be improved upon. One of our main aims is to go
beyond the basic question of distribution (access) to that of filtering, i.e. the process of
matching information with the scholars who want it. With the volume of information
production ever growing – and attention ever more scarce – filtering is becoming crucial
and digital technology offers the possibility of radical innovation in this area. In partic-
ular, distribution and filtering can be separated allowing filtering to be made open and
decentralized. This would promises to deliver dramatic increases in transparency and ef-
ficiency as well as greatly increased innovation in related product, processes and services.
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1. Introduction
It is crucial to the progress of any domain of scholarship that those engaged therein are
able to communicate their discoveries and activities to others. As such, a variety of systems
and institutions have been developed in order to support ‘scholarly communication’ in one
form or another ranging from personal letters to physical meetings. In recent times, the
growth of scholarship, combined with its increasing geographical dispersion, have resulted
in the centrality of the written word and its dissemination via ‘journals’. In this paper we
consider the purposes of any system of scholarly communication and consider the current
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under Creative Commons attribution (by) license v3.0 (all jurisdictions). First version: June 2008.
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academic journal system in light of them. This examination highlights several deficiencies
and also suggest various possible improvements.
When thinking about the possible mechanisms of scholarly communication it is useful
to specify in more detail the criteria against which they should be measured. That is, to
put it more succinctly, what do we want a good mechanism for scholarly communication
to do? In particular, when we say communicate we must ask ourselves what, to whom,
in what form, etc etc. For it is clear that when we talk of communication we usually
mean more than the simple transmission of a piece of information. In fact, today, with
so much scholarship available, the challenge may often not lie in the transmission from
the author to the reader but in the matching of authors and readers – the decision of
‘what to read’. This growing focus on choice is a natural one in a world where time and
attention are limited and the amount of scholarship available is ever increasing. As such it
suggests that there are at least two distinct functions performed by a system of scholarly
communication:
(1) Distribution – getting information from authors to readers (and back again)
(2) Selection (filtering) – deciding what to distribute and to whom
In appreciating this distinction it is illuminating to consider how practice has changed
over time. Originally communication between scholars, at least in written form, primarily
took the form of letters between the individuals involved. As such, the two activities of
distribution and filtering would be almost completely identical. Then, as the number of
authors and readers grew this became infeasible and dedicated journals would be created
which would then disseminate to their particular readers a selection of what was submitted
to them. Thus, what was once a direct peer-to-peer relationship became mediated by a
new institutional form: the academic journal – though of course journals were often run
by the very readers and authors who used them. Finally, today, thanks to digitization and
the Internet peer-to-peer is once again a possibility though with important differences:
unlike in the past, where a letter writer chooses the recipient, the modern peer-to-peer
approach more resembles journals in that the author and reader act independently – the
author uploads or publishes his/her work to a repository entirely separately from the
reader finding, downloading and reading it. This last discussion suggests breaking down
our original two categories a little further:
THE DISSEMINATION OF SCHOLARLY INFORMATION 3
(1) ‘Making available’ – publishing material
(2) Discovery – finding out what is available
(3) Choice – choosing from what is available
(4) Reading – getting access to the material (in the form required)
Here, the first and fourth item would come under the ‘distribution’ heading while the
second and third would come under ‘selection’. In addition we should mention two other
functions performed by such a system, both of which relate to selection: a) improvement of
work via peer-review (distinct from filtering process itself); b) ‘quality signalling’ whereby
the selection of work helps signal the quality of its creators which in turn is important for
the purpose of resource allocation (jobs, grants etc) within the scholarly community.
With these added to the list we now have a good number of separate goals which a
scholarly communication mechanism may seek to satisfy. The next stage is to consider
how the current system, largely based on academic journals, fares in respect of them.
1.1. Goals, Instruments and the Current Journal System. It is well known that in
order to fully address a given number of (independent) goals one needs an equal number
of instruments. For example, if one is seeking to address both congestion and pollution in
relation to road-traffic, a single instrument such as petrol taxes, will be insufficient.
Here too there are multiple independent goals, most notably distribution and selection
(matching). These are clearly distinct goals and require distinct instruments for their
achievement but journals are but a single instrument which combine distribution and
filtering in one mechanism.
Originally, the restrictions of reproduction and distribution technologies, meant they
were the best instrument available. Today, with the advent of the computer and the
Internet, this is no longer true: distribution (the uploading and downloading) can be done
by almost anyone and quite separately from recommendations and rating of that material.
As such, the traditional journal system is becoming a serious constraint, particularly
in its closed access form. There are two distinct aspects of this constraint. First, on
the distribution side, journals delay and restrict access as a result of higher prices arising
either from simple monopoly control or the costs of the (inefficient) selection mechanism
the traditional model necessitates. Second, on the selection side, the forced combination
of selection and distribution and the associated monopoly control of content greatly limit
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the efficiency (and utility1) of the selection and filtering processes used to match authors
and readers together.
Unfortunately, the two-sided nature of the journal market (based on expectations),
combined with the current evaluation structure of academia, continue to lock society
into this inefficient restriction. Open-access journals provides are an important part of
improving the current situation. However, as we discuss below, they are only a first step:
in order to reap the full benefits of new technology we must move away from the traditional
‘journal’ model to a system that allow for full separation between the distribution and
selection operations.
1.2. The Technological Origins of Modern Inefficiency. At this point it is worth
considering in a little more detail why restricted-access journals originally came about.
The answer lies in the nature of the technology available in earlier periods to manage
distribution (printing and transmission). When many journals were originally started
the cost of transmitting information was very high and journals acted as a club good by
which the costs of reproduction and distribution could be (efficiently) shared (the efficiency
arising here from economies of scale).
At the same time, given the limited ‘bandwidth’ available, it was natural for journals
to take on some filtering role in order to economize on the scarce distribution capacity.
In this situation, dissemination is limited and with only one instrument available (jour-
nals), it is natural to tie dissemination and filtering together (with filtering in many ways
secondary). Once filtering is being done it is natural for journals to ‘tie’ material to the
journal explicitly via copyright – though at an early stage given the scale economies of
journals this explicit tying was not actually necessary and was probably done for simple
legal convenience.
With the advent of digital communications, in particular the Internet, bandwidth is no
longer scarce. What is now scarce is attention. In this setup the importance of a journal
is not its role in efficiently sharing reproduction and distribution costs but its role as a
filtering mechanism. However, there is now a problem: when distribution is central it is
natural to ‘add-in’ filtering, it is not natural, or necessary, to tie distribution to filtering
when filtering is central. In fact, it seems clear that distribution and filtering can be done
1After all what good is it to find an article if you cannot read it.
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entirely separately (there are potentially many ways for one to download my paper quite
separate from getting it from a journal – and lots of ways to do matching and filtering
other than by journal editors and reviewers). The Open Access movement can be seen as
largely about achieving this separation: with open access there is no longer a connection
between access/distribution (which would be free) and the filtering mechanism (the choice
of which articles go in a particular journal).
That said the ‘Open Access’ movement still has a large focus on journals – albeit open-
access ones. This, in our view, is a mistake. Technology has also affected possibilities
for filtering. In particular it is no longer clear why the centralized mechanism of official
peer-review and journals is superior to alternative decentralized options. The last decade,
has witnessed widespread, and often successful, experimentation with distributed voting
and evaluation mechanisms (for example Slashdot’s story-ratings and Google’s link-based
site rankings).
Thus, to be more radical, it makes sense not only to remove centralized control of
distribution but also centralized control of filtering. A more distributed (market-like?)
filtering mechanism would permit the same freedom (and potentially same status) for
reviewing and recommendation as it does in the production of scholarly information. At
the same time it would deliver greater transparency and, by permitting ‘free-entry’ in
filtering, would permit greater specialization, greater diversity, increased participation
and the increasing efficiency flowing from greater competition.2
As such, the gains from going ‘open’ are not simply wider access, but a reduction in the
time and energy scholars spend finding and processing research information. Significantly,
this second item, which is less frequently mentioned in discussions of ‘Open Access’, may
well be the most significant.
2. Background and Existing Literature
Before delving into the model it is worth providing some background especially in
relation to what open access is and what relevant analyses already exist in the literature.
Open Access (OA) journals are defined by the absence of exclusive copyright on their
contents. In the digital age, this translates to an article delivery price of zero to readers.
2Later in this article we will discuss a concrete system for implementing a decentralized filtering mechanism
in relation to scholarly work.
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Essentially, the journal’s role is reduced to rubber-stamping already available articles that
they deem to be of sufficient quality (Bergstrom, 2001; Tenopir et al., 2000).
Technically, OA vs. non-OA journals has nothing to do with profit vs. non-profit.
However, the two issues have become somewhat conflated for two reasons. First, for
obvious reasons, an OA journal, are almost always non-profit. Second, even non-OA non-
profit journals have been shown to charge much less than profit journals (as part of their
mandate is to promote readership).
It is noteworthy, especially in light of our later discussions, that there is clear evidence
that commercial publishers are exploiting their market power. Studies by Bergstrom and
Bergstrom (2004) and Dewatripont et al. (2007) demonstrate that commercial publishers
charge approximately three times as much as journals produced by non-profit scientific
organizations. These studies employ a wide variety of controls, including quality (via
citations).
This evidence is also supported by the trend in prices. Tenopir et al. (2000) trace the
trend in rising prices from the late 1970s through to the 1990s – a period of immense
consolidation in the industry, and McCabe (2002) also demonstrates that part of the
recent price increases can be attributed to merger activity among the leading commercial
publishers.
Of course, open access, whether via journals or otherwise, can have problems. In theory,
the principal criticism levelled at OA journals is that charging publication fees creates an
incentive to ’over-publish’ as publishing is the source of revenue. On the other hand
if revenues come from readers, then the incentive is to be more selective since readers’
willingness-to-pay will be increasing in article quality. In terms of the dynamic consistency
literature, the temptation to publish substandard articles is greater under OA revenue
schemes. McCabe and Snyder (2005) and Jeon and Rochet (2007) also offer some more
subtle potential drawbacks of relying on publication fees based on formal modelling of the
interplay between author and reader demand.
However it takes no more than a straightforward application of the Folk Theorem to
note that, given a sufficiently long horizon, reputation effects can overpower any static
temptation to defect. This point was stressed by the UK Commons (2004) report on the
academic publishing industry.
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This possibility has been borne out in practice, where the PLoS OA journals have
achieved high impact factors in a short period of time. It is also worth noting that the
incentives to ‘defect’ are arguably much higher for the many firms that exist purely to
rate other firms’ products (e.g., consumerreports.com), yet these firms persist rather than
collapsing under the temptation of endorsing the highest-bidder among the firms that they
are rating.
As mentioned above, in the digital age, the marginal cost of delivering articles is virtually
zero. This is an addition to the fact that digital journals can generate total savings or
approximately 30% (Tenopir et al. (2000)). This implies that any positive reader price
generates deadweight loss (DWL) on the reader’s side. Similarly charges on the author
side (as are often proposed for the OA model) may generate costs by limiting what gets
published. These potential inefficiencies, and their minimization, have been the main focus
of the economic literature so far (e.g. McCabe (2002); McCabe and Snyder (2005); Jeon
and Rochet (2007)).3
Here, as already indicated by our introduction, we wish to leave these ‘access’ question
largely to one side and focus instead on what we have termed ‘selection’. Specifically, we
wish to examine what additional selection and filtering costs (or benefits) arise from the
closed access model and the associated monopoly control of content. As our survey above
indicates this particular point has so far received little attention.
3. Model
This model is obviously, and intentionally, heavily simplified. Its aim is to capture the
key features of our argument not to provide a complete and exact model of the mechanisms
of scholarly information production and dissemination.
Our focus will be on the distribution and filtering of scholarly information and we
therefore begin by abstracting entirely from the production side and assume, simply, that
there is a single piece (or set) of information to be disseminated which we will term ‘A’
3Some other points have been raised, albeit relatively minor, for example, the advantage to OA journals ns
eliminating reader-pricing administration costs (UK Commons (2004), Willinsky (2005)). Though these
must obviously be replaced with account management on the author side, when publication fees are used
this still translates to a substantial cost saving.
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(to stand for ‘article’ or set of ‘articles’).4 This ‘article’ has a quality value q which follows
some probability distribution G (which is common knowledge). There are N scholars who
wish to have access to scholarly information. A scholar’s utility from having access to an
article is:5
U = EG(q)− c
Where c is the cost of obtaining (and ‘using’) the article. Scholars’ outside options, that
is their payoff if they do not obtain the article, is normalized to 0.
Our analysis proceeds in stages. First, we analyse the case without a Journal6 and
without filtering (termed ‘direct access’). Next we analyse the case with a Journal but
without filtering and finally the case of both a Journal and filtering. The salient points
we seek to highlight with the model are that:
• A Journal offers economies of scale in distribution. When direct access is costly
this makes a Journal an efficient distribution mechanism.
• Filtering may be attractive even without a Journal but it is naturally bundled with
a Journal since the activities of collation for distribution and collation for filtering
are naturally complementary.
• However as direct access costs drop the value of a Journal as a distribution mech-
anism erodes but its monopoly (based on expectations) in filtering may remain.
3.1. Basic Case: Direct Access without Filtering. With direct access individual
scholar receives article directly (i.e. without going via journal) at cost i. We shall ignore
the possibility of filtering for the time being and thus in this case the expected quality is
just the average q¯ and we have:
UD = EG(q)− i = q¯ − i
The scholarly information is then disseminated if and only if If UD ≥ 0.
4We could allow the number of articles to be a choice parameter but it adds little to the analysis except
complexity. What is important, and is also omitted by this assumption, is article/scholar heterogeneity in
tastes. We shall return to this question below.
5A natural extension to this approach would be to allow heterogeneity across scholars, for example by
including a parameter θ in the utility function to capture variation (whether in value or costs). In fact
it would then be natural to invert the setup slightly to define a reduced form demand function D(qe, c)
depending on expected quality qe and costs c. However, for the time being we stick with this simpler
formulation.
6In what follows we shall assume only a single Journal for simplicity. Where this assumption has important
consequences for the analysis it will be noted.
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3.2. A Journal. Now suppose there exists a Journal to which scholars can subscribe for
a fee p and which in return distributes the article(s) to them. The main feature of a
Journal (initially) will be its access to an distribution/reproduction technology exhibiting
economies of scale. In particular we assume that a Journal has fixed costs H and marginal
costs of j < i. So total costs with N users are H + jN and thus the Journal’s profit is:
Π = Np− (H + jN)
The Journal has no means to alter quality so a scholar’s utility from purchase is:
UJ = q¯ − p
At this point we shall not make an explicit assumption about the Journal’s pricing
approach (it can be anything between a shared club run by the scholars and just breaking
even and a fully profit-oriented enterprise). Nevertheless we can determine whether the
Journal can charge a price sufficient to cover costs and thus whether the Journal is feasible.
The Journal’s cost per user (with N users) is clearly:
cJ =
H
N
+ j
Thus for the Journal to be feasible its price p ≥ cJ . The Journal’s upper bound on price
is set by the scholars’ outside options which are either direct access yielding (U = UD) or
of not accessing any information (U = 0). Thus, for scholars to use the Journal requires:
p ≤ min(i, q¯)
Thus, assuming the Journal prices to ensure it is used, a Journal will exist and be used
whenever:
H
N
+ j = cJ ≤ min(i, q¯)
In terms of comparative statics this suggests that Journals emerge as:
• The scholarly community grows (N increases).
• The technology of large-scale production and distribution improves relative to that
of direct access (j << i) – e.g. consider large-scale printing versus hand-written
or hand-typed missives.
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It is noteworthy that many of the first academic Journals emerged in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century in an era which saw both a substantial increase in the size of
the academic scholarly community and a significant improvement in commercial printing
and distribution technologies over those available to private individuals.
3.3. Stand-Alone Filtering. We now add to the model the key concept of ‘filtering’.
The idea of ‘filtering’ is that by incurring some cost (of effort, money, etc) f(q) it is possible
to provide an article set of expected average quality q. Note that by retaining q¯ to be
the expected quality under the original distribution we have f(q¯) = 0. To take this into
account define q′ = q − q¯ and re-define f in terms of q′, f ≡ f(q′), so that f(0) = 0. We
shall assume that once a set of articles has been selected there is no additional cost to
providing it to an additional user (other than the cost of communication).
Let us consider first the case without a Journal. Let pf be the price for a filtered set
then the utility of a scholar using this filtered set is:
Uf = q − 2i− pf
The extra i cost here represents the cost of acquiring the filtered information from
the filterer in addition to the cost of subsequently obtaining the relevant articles. For
the present we shall ignore the structure of the filtering market and simply assume that
filtering is provided at its socially optimal level, i.e. where the quality level q∗ satisfies
f ′(q∗) = N .7
The surplus generated by filtering (excluding distribution costs i) equals q∗− q¯− f∗N . It
will be convenient to have a single symbol to denote this value and we shall use φ. Then
in the case of competition (i.e. all gains accrue to scholars) a scholar’s utility is given by:
Uf = q∗ − q¯ − f
∗
N
− i+ q¯ − i = φ− i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Filtering Gain
+ q¯ − i︸︷︷︸
Initital Situation
3.4. Filtering with a Journal. We now turn to filtering with a Journal. In this case
we shall assume that the Journal can do filtering in-house at cost fJ(q). We explicitly
differentiate Journal filtering costs from independent filtering because it is assumed that
7Note because of the linearity of the relationship of quality and price, assuming that producer and consumer
surplus are equivalent, it does not matter how the price is set as it just affects the allocation of surplus
between ‘filterers’ and scholars.
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the filtering is tied to the Journal.8 The other difference from stand-alone filtering is that
the Journal can distribute its filtering information at no additional cost – it is embodied
in the selection of articles. Journal profits with filtering then are given by:
ΠJf (p, q) = Np− (H + jN + fJ(q))
By the linearity of the utility function UJf = q− p the first order condition for Journal
quality is the same as that just discussed in the case of stand-alone filtering:
f ′J(q
∗
J) = N
A scholar’s utility from the Journal is:
UJf = q − p = q∗J − p
A Journal maximal profits are then:
ΠJf = Nq∗J − (H + jN + f(q∗J))
= N(q∗J − q¯ −
f∗J
N
+ q¯)− (H + jN)
= N(φJ + q¯)− (H + jN)
Thus a journal is feasible if:
φJ + q¯ ≥ H
N
+ j ≡ cJ
Conversely, the maximal possible utility for users is (setting price so that the Journal
just breaks even):
q∗J − cJ −
f(q∗J
N
= φJ + q¯ − cJ
A Journal will be used in preference to the stand-alone option if:
φJ − (φ− i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
J Filtering ‘Advantage’
+ (i− cJ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Distribution ‘Advantage’
≥ 0
Implications:
8One could allow a Journal to buy-in ‘filtering’ from outside. However given the centrality of filtering
to the identity of a Journal as well as the nature of the reviewing process (largely done by the scholarly
community) it is likely that the filtering will be explicitly associated with the Journal. More on this issue
can be found below.
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• A Journal will always performing filtering (φJ is positive) and filtering increases
the likelihood that the Journal is feasible.
• The complementarity in distribution of articles and information on quality gives
the journal a significant advantage if costs of stand-alone distribution (i) are high.
In particular, the journal can be worse at filtering (φJ versus φ) but still have a
filtering advantage (as long as φJ ≥ φ− i).
• When communication costs are important a journal may also have a significant cost
advantage in the filtering ‘technology’ as there will be obvious complementarities
between receiving and processing articles for filtering and doing so for distribution.
In this case φJ > φ. Assuming a journal is at least as cost efficient a distribution
mechanism as stand-alone distribution this implies that a Journal will always be
used in preference to the stand-alone option.
Again this fits the historical record: once journals came into existence they performed
filtering. Furthermore, if a journal offers significant distribution cost advantages (stand-
alone distribution is costly) it is also probable that is has significant filtering advantages
based both on the complementarity of distributing filtering information and articles and
the complementarity of the filtering process and normal article distribution operation.
Lastly, it is important to note that there are other reasons to inter-link filtering and
distribution than simple economies of scope. Naturally filtering providers may wish to
assert exclusivity. This can be difficult to operate effectively without a Journal (one
would need to be able to assert monopoly control over the selection list which might be
difficult). However once filtering is associated with a Journal the matter is simple. Since
the Journal obtains copyright over the articles contained therein the Journal is able to
prevent anyone accessing those articles other than through the Journal.
4. Digitization and Filtering
We now wish to consider what happens with the advent of modern digital communica-
tion and computer technologies. In our model, this will equate to the cost of transmission,
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and hence the cost of distribution, dropping to zero:9
cJ = i = 0
By removing ‘distribution’ from the equation this has the result of reducing the discus-
sion to a comparison of selection (filtering) mechanisms.10 In particular, in our case, a
comparison of the stand-alone and journal models becomes a comparison of their filtering
technologies: f(q) and fJ(q). As such, it is now important for us to go into more detail
both about what these technologies involve and how they are affected by the institutional
mechanisms of which they are part in which they operate (e.g. as part of a journal).
4.1. Centralized and Distributed Filtering. We begin by observing that, for scholarly
information, a large part of filtering is provided directly by scholars themselves in the form
of reviewing.11 The need for filtering to be done by scholars themselves is obvious: it is
only someone doing research who is able to judge the type and quality of another’s work.
Furthermore, this reviewing is considered sufficiently important to the community at large
that it is frequently done for ‘free’.12 In this sense then, the creation of ‘filtering’ begins as a
form of ‘peer-production’ across a distributed network (the scholarly community) utilizing
the efficiencies arising from the clear complementarities between research and reviewing.
However, as it stands, the system is ultimately a centralized one in that reviews are
not publicly available but provided to, and solicited by, a journal, which then processes
the information as it sees fit (usually non-transparently), and makes available filtering
information only in the form of the journals decision to carry (or not) a particular article.
9Of course many (perhaps most) journals still provide ‘print’ versions. However: a) such a facility is not
essential to a journal and could always be provided separately b) we are concerned with the cheapest
feasible options for communication c) the majority of communication in this area is now online (even if
much material is then subsequently printed out).
10One could argue that there are still concerns about, for example, storage of material. However, while
this is not costless it is relatively so cheap to provide as part of standard academic infrastructure that it
is free for the community to use (cf. http://arxiv.org/, http://repec.org, the myriad of institutional
repositories).
11Here we are subsuming reviewing within filtering. Clearly reviewing may also lead to the improvement
of the quality of work and not just selection (as implied by the term ‘filtering’). However the difference is
not great and makes little difference to this analysis.
12Of course there are reasons that scholars review for free other than simple public-spiritedness. The
ability to influence what is read and accepted in the community can be personally valuable (and can even,
on occasion be abused). Similarly, especially for junior scholars, reviewing may be a necessary way to earn
credit with their elders particularly on the more powerful journals and to ensure that their own work is
considered.
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Thus, in its present form, filtering, at least at the formal level,13 is almost all journal
based, and journal driven, and as such centralized.
There are, however, much more decentralized, or ‘distributed’, mechanisms available. In
particular, ‘reviewing’14 could be made independent of journals and itself opened up (i.e.
review information becomes public). With this basic information now available (rather
than hidden behind the centralized filterer), a myriad of aggregation possibilities open up.
For example, one could imagine the usage of the types of voting processes already used on
Internet news sites such as Slashdot, Digg, and Reddit which allow for the simultaneous
aggregation of large number of votes weighted by reliability/credibility metrics. Alterna-
tively, individuals could utilize ‘reviews’ directly using their own weightings or decide to
use the reviews and weightings of a specific group (what we term NotAJournals). These
possibilities, together with a detailed description of how a distributed mechanism would
work, are discussed at greater length in an appendix. Here, the key point we want to
make is that the distributed model offers some major benefits relative to the traditional
centralized journal one.15
First, it reduces information wastage. In a centralized system the filtering information
reaching the community via journals is much coarser than that originally being produced
in the form of reviews whereas in the decentralized system all that basic information is
available to all.16 Furthermore, the many ‘reviews’ produced outside of the journal system
are not used – for example, scholars read, and form opinions on, a large amount of material
in the course of their research yet in the current system there is little opportunity for that
information to be used.17
Second, in a centralized, journal-based system, there is significant wastage of effort.
This occurs because of duplication: the same article being processed by two (or more)
13Of course we all use our personal experience to form opinions about what to read but this is an informal
process seldom extending beyond ourselves, or at most, a small group of colleagues.
14We should emphasize that once considering more distributed mechanisms it is necessary to expand the
concept of reviewing to include any expression of meaningful opinion be that a simple vote or detailed
commentary.
15A useful analogy here is the contrast between centrally planned (or firm-based) versus market-based
production. In a centrally planned system information (prices, capacities, demand) may be obtained
from multiple sources but it is processed and disseminated centrally. In the market-based system this
information is distributed throughout the market network.
16The Journal system does have different incentive effects on reviewers: quality decisions are anonymized
to some extent which can help in soliciting honest appraisals (though it can also lead to abuse). However,
a distributed system can also provide for anonymization if necessary – see below.
17Other than, one might argue, in the very crude form of citations.
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different journals; and because of the administrative burden of managing the submission
and reviewing process.18
Third, reviewing becomes a first-order, and more prestigious, activity with greater op-
portunity for specialization – at the present time, reviewing, is generally considered a very
secondary activity, providing rather limited credit within the community.
Fourth, transparency is improved as there is now a clear separation of the reviewing
and aggregation process. Fifth, and finally, it allows for competition and innovation in the
aggregation (and reviewing) process. Entry as a filtering service is very easy and services
are free to experiment with different algorithms, methods and types of reviews (and there
is a pressure to improve provided by the users).19
Of all of these factors the most important, we think, are the first and last. These both
deal with the information loss under a centralized model and imply significant efficiency
gains from a distributed approach. Given the supposed attractiveness then, of the dis-
tributed approach, we must ask why the centralized journal model is currently dominant.
4.2. The Existence and Persistence of the Closed, Centralized Model. To un-
derstand the persistence of the ‘closed’, ‘centralized’ model recall that ‘closed’ journals
necessarily tie distribution and filtering by asserting exclusive rights (using copyright) in
the articles they carry. As discussed at the end of section 3.4, this tying is necessary be-
cause otherwise there would be no effective way to control access to their filtering service.
This has a dramatic impact: without access to the underlying articles filtering is both
less valuable (what good is knowing about an article if you cannot access it) and much
harder to perform (how can one assess an article if one has not read it). Thus, by asserting
exclusivity over articles, these ‘closed’ journals automatically and directly undermine any
kind of distributed filtering scheme. One of the great benefits then of an ‘open-access’
approach, even if still in the form of a journal,20 is that it does not do this. Open-access
18This is not to say there would not be some costs of a similar kind in an alternative system but these
would likely be significantly less – there would be no manuscript processing,
19Concrete examples, including such possibilities as using reviews of reviews, personal weightings, can be
found in the appendix.
20It is important to note here that a large part of the ‘open-access’ effort is directed not at journals
but simply at building institutional repositories wherein articles can be deposited and then made openly
available. This is obviously perfectly compatible with the distributed approach – and in fact some kind of
article repository is a clear prerequisite for the distributed filtering to function (see appendix).
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journals therefore are compatible with distributed filtering approaches even if not directly
supportive of them.21
This is only half of the explanation however. ‘Closed’ journals can prevent distributed
filtering happening but why do they exist in the first place and continue to persist? The
answer to the first part is provided by our work in the previous sections. When communica-
tion costs are high journals are highly attractive as distribution mechanisms. Furthermore,
they will naturally evolve to provide filtering (and in any case distributed filtering would
be entirely impractical without (almost) zero-cost digital communications). Thus, ini-
tially, journals are the only feasible mechanisms. However, as we discussed at the start of
this section technology has changed so we come to the second part: why does the (closed)
journal model persist in the digital environment?
The answer here too is simple: lock-in. As filterers, journals gradually evolve market-
power because of the build-up of expectations on the two sides of its operations (authors
and readers). Authors wish to submit to ‘good’ journals (with lots of readers) and readers
want to access ‘good’ articles. Furthermore, the journal system is no longer simply about
communication but also has complex inter-linkages with the mechanisms for reward and
advancement within the academy. Since, expectations are persistent and once established
are slow to change it is very hard to move away from the existing equilibrium – neither au-
thors nor readers will wish to deviate unless convinced the other party will simultaneously
do so (and authors, even those with a preference for open-access or distributed models,
have the added pressure to submit to ‘good’ journals in and of themselves).22 As a result,
it is very hard to switch from a ‘closed’ journal model to an alternative – even if it offers
significant advantages.23
21The one obvious way an open-access journal detracts from the distributed model is that it obfuscates
the reviewing information. However, this could at least be partially addressed by open-access publications
giving reviewers the option to have their review made public (with the option for anonymization or redaction
if requested).
22This kind of lock-in is standard to all indirect network effect (two-sided platform) models of which
journals are a classic example. See on indirect network effects and two-sided platforms, Church et al.
(2003); Nocke et al. (2007); Pollock (2009), on specific application to journals see McCabe and Snyder
(2007); Jeon and Rochet (2007).
23In addition there are also some basic political economy considerations. The very existence of lock-in
engenders market-power and, hence, at for-profit journals, very substantial profits. This in turn generates
strong incentives for those organizations to preserve the current system. At the same time, the benefits
from a distributed model would largely accrue to the scholarly community as a whole. That community,
though large, is uncoordinated and some of its members, especially its more senior ones, already have a
large investment in the existing system.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper we set out the basic goals of the scholarly communication system. We
compared the current, journal dominated system, against those goals and found it wanting,
and explored in detail alternative options in which distribution and filtering are separated
and centralized filtering is replaced by a distributed, decentralized approach.
Using a simple model we explored the factors underlying the development of the cur-
rent journal paradigm. There were two main factors: a) the high costs of information
transmission in the pre-digital era (and, associatedly, fixed costs and economies of scale in
transmission which make journals an effective club good) b) the natural complementarity
of filtering to distribution which leads journals to act as filtering as well as distributional
mechanisms.
With the collapse of transmission costs in the era of the Internet these original ratio-
nales for journals have disappeared. It is now possible for distribution and filtering to be
separate and for the development of richer, and more complex filtering models based on
decentralized, distributed mechanisms – with this latter process dependent on the first
(if distribution and filtering are tied – as in the traditional journal model – distributed
mechanisms make little sense).
We explored the various benefits of such alternative distributed mechanisms – and also
provide a detailed description of how such a mechanism would function in appendix A.
One of the main implications of our work discussion is that a crucial benefit of the open-
access approach, in addition to the obvious one of reducing the deadweight loss to access,
is that it permits the development of radically new matching mechanisms based on a
richer set of information which offer major efficiency (and other) advantages. This second
benefit, though often overlooked, is a major one, and is, in the long run we believe, likely
to be the most significant.
Unfortunately, it is hard for new approaches to take hold because of the lock-in to the
traditional ‘closed’ journal model engendered by the mutual expectations of authors and
readers. Given the potential benefits afforded by innovation in this area, it is crucial that
the potential of new approaches be thoroughly considered so that the scholarly commu-
nity can adequately assess the options and, if necessary, take collective action to achieve
mutually beneficial change.
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Appendix A. Distributed Filtering: A Proposal
Here we give a concrete proposal as to how a distributed filtering mechanism for schol-
arly information would function:
• All papers are uploaded to ‘open’ repositories from which free access is allowed.
Each paper receives an identifier.
• All members of the community (or anyone in fact) are allocated identifiers by the
Reviewing/Filtering network
• There exist Reviewing/Filtering servers where people can log on and make a ‘re-
view’ of a paper. A review could consist of a single vote or a proper detailed
critique.
• Review weighting and ranking. Given review weighting (and perhaps author rank-
ing) one can produce a ‘quality’ value for each paper. The weighting system would
be one of the most obvious places for innovation and competition to deliver effi-
ciency improvements. We discuss this in more detail below but do mention one
important aspect:
• Ranking and Reviewing/Filtering by groups (NotAJournals). One major innova-
tion permitted is that one need not have one single ranking/weighting algorithm.
Instead one could allow groups to form which supplied their own weights and
ranking (most obviously they could have a weighting in which only reviews by the
group mattered – this corresponds to a traditional journal).
A.1. Reviews. At its simplest a review is a ‘vote’ (this could either be discrete e.g. one
of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or it could continuous e.g. any number ∈ [1, 5].)24 However it can also
include full commentary in the traditional manor. The more detailed this commentary
the more valuable the review. Reviews could also be non-anonymous. Non-anonymous
reviews could be given higher weight than a non-anonymous review.
A.2. Ranking and Review Weighting. As discussed already it is suggested that there
could be many different ranking and weighting functions. However, it is still worth consid-
ering some of the general attractive properties. For example, weighting should probably
be higher for non-anonymous reviews – though this weighting would be interacted with
24We wish to explicitly using a range such as [−1, 1] that contains zero as we wish to reserve that for the
case where no rating has been provided.
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the valency of the review with negative non-anonymous reviews getting a higher weighting
than positive non-anonymous reviews. The weighting would be higher for detailed reviews
than non-detailed reviews. Of course this may be difficult to implement in an automated
way. To remedy this it might make sense to take the whole reviewing mechanism a step
back and ‘review’ reviews. That is, just as scholars can vote on articles, they can vote on
reviews of articles. These reviews of reviews would then used to generate (or alter) the
weighting system for reviewers and hence of reviews. Users would not be confined to using
the default weighting system but could design their own. This issue is considered in the
next section.
A.3. NotAJournals. A given user could decide that they only care about non-anonymous
reviews provided by a particular group of people – this would correspond to a weighting
of zero for the rest of the reviewing population. Extending this it is natural for groups to
develop to review in particular areas. Members of such a group would review particular
sets of articles (with efforts to ensure that each article gets reviewed by at least several
members of the group). At the same time the group could make available a weight-set cor-
responding exactly to that group as well as a selected articles set – members of the group
likely also review outside of the area of this group and so a weight-set is not sufficient
information to permit others to just get the group’s set of recommended articles. The
group would thus be making available a particularly set of reviewed articles. In this sense
the group would function, at least on the filtering side of things, much like a traditional
journal. However they would not have exclusivity over the articles. For this reason we
have christened them NotAJournals.25
A.4. Formal Mechanism. Formally we could describe the system as consisting of schol-
ars si (i = 1, 2, ...), articles aj , reviews by scholar of articles rij (note that a review and
just be a single number of could be considered as a tuple of rating plus other attributes
such as comments). A weight-set is then a tuple of weights {wi} together with a review
evaluation function f (which is a function of the computable attributes of the review, the
25This name, to our knowledge, was originally coined by David Levine who started his NAJ Economics in
2001.
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article and the scholar). A overall weight function is then:
W (aj) =
∑
i
wif(rij , aj)
Some examples:
• Simplest linear case. The only attributes of the review are a rating which with
simple linear weighting would give:
W (aj) =
∑
wirij
• Give value for detailed comments, so rij is a tuple consisting of ‘numeric’ rating
plus indicator of whether review was detailed or not.
• Limiting to only caring about reviews from reviewers with expertise in that area
etc. This is similar to first example but where wi are set to 0 for all reviewers
without expertise.
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